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HOUSING WAS AT THE CENTER of the financial train wreck of
2007–2008 that has seriously damaged most rich countries. In many countries, the
effects of that crisis on the wider economy have been large, negative, and persis-
Q1
tent. In some cases, sharp declines in house values and steep increases in defaults
on mortgages were causal factors behind the problems for banks, which then af-
fected credit conditions and confidence more widely. The United States, Spain, and
Ireland fall into this category. In other countries, the fall in house values and the rise
in bad debts have been less severe and was more a consequence of the catastrophic
decline in confidence that came in the wake of the financial problems and which
led to a reduction in incomes and higher unemployment. Perhaps France and the
UK fall into this category. Some countries have experienced few problems—house
prices have not fallen and arrears and defaults on home loans have not picked up
significantly—with Canada and Germany in this group.
Housing is a large part of the wealth of the household sector; construction activity
is a significant part of total output that contributes disproportionately to its volatility;
housing transactions create work and value added for a large number of people in the
real estate, banking and legal sectors. As a result, turbulence in housing markets has
Q2
Q3
major macroeconomic effects.1 That is why governments, financial regulators, and
central banks are thinking hard about the lessons to learn from the crisis of recent
years. In this paper, I want to consider some of the policies—including monetary
policy—that might be used to reduce the risks of turbulence in the housing market.
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FIG. 1. Real House Prices, 2007 = 100
SOURCES: OECD Economic Outlook 93 (database), Bank of England calculations.
NOTE: The underlying data are percentage changes on previous year of house prices deflated by the private consumption
deflator.
I will argue that one factor is particularly significant in accounting for the degree of
volatility in housing markets and the harm that it can do—leverage, that is, the fact
that houses are bought with such a high proportion of debt. In that context I consider
the advantages of (and obstacles to) greater use of outside equity in financing house
purchases.
1. THE SCALE OF THE RECENT PROBLEMS
In many countries, house price volatility in the 6 or so years on either side of the
financial crises of 2007–2008 has been extreme. Figure 1 illustrates the path of real
house prices (that is an index of average nominal house values relative to the private
consumption deflator). It is clear that there are major differences between countries.
In Ireland, real house prices have fallen by about 50% since the peak of early 2007. In
Spain and in the United States, the fall has been a bit less extreme, with prices down
by about 30% in real terms. In the UK, prices are down by about 20%; in France, they
are barely down at all and in Canada and Germany average home prices have moved
on a relatively gentle trajectory not much different from the years immediately before
the global banking problems.
Figure 2 shows what has happened to construction activity. In Spain and Ireland,
construction in the years before the financial crisis was high relative to GDP and rising;
since 2007 it has collapsed. The picture is less dramatic in other countries though
in most cases there was a substantial decline in new building in the years after the
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FIG. 2. Construction, Relative to Total Economic Activity.
SOURCES: Bureau of Economic Analysis, Eurostat, Statistics Canada, Bank of England calculations.
financial crisis. Housing starts have fallen more dramatically than overall construction
activity (Figure 3) because construction includes more stable components such as
repair and maintenance. In all countries, the level of housing starts is below the levels
in the years immediately before the crisis; in many cases, it is very far below the
peak.
Houses are overwhelmingly financed by a combination of equity from the owner–
occupier and by debt. For new home owners debt is by far the largest component
of overall funding. The big rise in house prices in the years leading up to the crisis
in many countries was only feasible because the stock of mortgage debt was rising
fast. Between 2000 and 2007 the stock of mortgage debt relative to GDP rose by 22
percentage points (pp) in the United States, by 58pp in Ireland,2 by 36pp in Spain,
and by 27pp in the UK (Figure 4). Figures 5 and 6 show in more detail what happened
to the stock of mortgage (and other) debt relative to household incomes in the UK and
the United States in the years either side of the banking crisis. There was a substantial
rise in the amount of debt relative to incomes between 2000 and 2007, followed by a
significant fall as new mortgage lending declined dramatically.
The fact that houses are bought with large amounts of outside debt is one reason
why housing market outcomes over the past 10 years have been so volatile—those
countries where mortgage debt rose fastest were those where the subsequent falls in
house prices and housing starts were greatest. In an upswing when expectations are
that house values will continue to rise, the returns from using debt to finance house
purchase look very high—gearing scales up those returns, and supplying mortgages
2. The figure for Ireland is relative to 2001, as data are not available for 2000.
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FIG. 3. Housing Starts, 2006 = 100.
SOURCES: National Institute for Statistics and Economic Studies, Bloomberg, U.S. Census Bureau, German Federal
Statistical Office, and Irish Central Statistics Office.
NOTE: France, Spain, Canada, United States, UK information is for building (housing) starts during the period. Data for
Germany and Ireland is for planning permissions granted.
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FIG. 4. Mortgage Debt-to-GDP Ratios.
SOURCES: Bureau of Economic Analysis, Eurostat, Federal Reserve Economic Data, Statistics Canada, Bank of England
calculations.
NOTE: The series for Canada is constructed as household mortgage debt, which includes all mortgage debt, not only
residential. Data for France, Germany, Ireland, Spain, and the UK are based on households’ long term liabilities supplied
by Eurostat. U.S. data are households’ home mortgage liabilities relative to GDP.
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FIG. 5. Mortgages and other Household Liabilities in the UK—Percentage of Disposable Income.
SOURCES: ONS, Bank of England calculations.
NOTE: Data cover households and nonprofit institutions serving households. ONS’s gross disposable income figures
(QWND), which excludes taxes on income, social contributions and other transfers. Other liabilities are the difference
between households’ total financial liabilities and loans secured on dwellings. 2013 H1 data are second quarter liabilities
over the annualized sum of seasonally adjusted first and second quarter gross disposable income data.
will be a low-risk business if house values continue to rise. These forces go into
reverse once the expectation that house prices will rise evaporates and the perceived
probability that prices might fall substantially becomes significant. That is why
housing transactions, new home starts, and mortgage lending fell so very sharply
after 2007 in the countries where lending and prices had risen so fast in the years that
came before.
High leverage (or gearing) can create all sorts of problems. It creates highly volatile
paths for the net wealth of home owners; it creates incentive problems at close to
zero equity; it increases affordability issues for borrowers because the servicing
cost of debt is unrelated to changes in the value of their home or to their income.
The affordability issues are not solved by changing the extent to which the interest
rate on mortgage debt is variable or fixed—affordability issues still arise because
whether the future interest rate is known or not, it is not indexed to the value of
the house or to the income of the home owner. In terms of reducing volatility and
uncertainty about the cost of mortgage debt neither fixed nor variable interest rates
on mortgage debt are sensitive in the right way to house price or income risk, because
those risks are significantly idiosyncratic (or at least regionally specific within a
common monetary policy area).
Asset prices and transactions volumes in asset markets should not be expected to
be constant in an efficient market. But to believe that the very volatile outcomes we
briefly reviewed above are consistent with an efficient allocation of resources is not
plausible. It is very hard to believe that the volatility in housing market outcomes,
and the rise in defaults on mortgages (Figure 7), we have seen in recent years in
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FIG. 6. Mortgages and other Household Liabilities in the US—Percentage of Disposable Income.
SOURCES: Bureau of Economic Analysis, Federal Reserve, Bank of England calculations.
NOTE: Liabilities of households and nonprofit organizations relative to disposable personal income (net of taxes and
contributions for government social insurance). Other liabilities calculated as the difference between total liabilities and
home mortgages. 2013 H1 data are second quarter liabilities over second quarter disposable income data seasonally
adjusted at annual rates.
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FIG. 7. Mortgage Arrears.
SOURCES: Bank of Ireland, Bank of Spain, Canadian Bankers’ Association, CML, Eurostat, Federal Reserve Bank of New
York.
NOTE: Data for Canada, Ireland, Spain, and the UK are the number of mortgages in arrears for more than 3 months as
a proportion of total mortgage accounts. Data for the United States are the proportion of mortgage balance 90+ days
delinquent. Data for France and Germany are the proportion of population who are in arrears on both mortgages and rent.
Underlying data for Canada are monthly; the chart plots end-quarter figures. Data for France and Germany are annual.
The rest of the data is quarterly.
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FIG. 8. Mortgage Product Interest Variability
SOURCE: Lea, M. (2010), “International comparison of mortgage product offerings,” Report, Research Institute for
Housing America, Washington, September, available at www.housingamerica.org/RIHA/RIHA/Publications/74023
_10122_Research_RIHA_Lea_Report.pdf (accessed 23 October 2013).
many rich countries is anything other than harmful. So how could the housing market
become less volatile in a way which does not create substantial distortions? I want
to consider two ways in which that might happen: through the use of monetary (and
possibly macroprudential) policy and as a result of house purchases being financed
with some outside equity and less debt.
2. MONETARY POLICY
Because a high proportion of house purchases—especially for marginal buyers—
are financed through debt, changes in the level of interest rates can have a substantial
impact upon the housing market. But variations in interest rates that central banks
can control are rather a blunt instrument to stabilize the housing market. Indeed,
the impact on assets other than houses, and the effects on borrowing and spending
unrelated to housing, may well be far greater than the impact on housing. Changes in
interest rates have an effect on a high proportion of people throughout the economy
and impact the value of a wide range of assets. The majority of nonfinancial companies
are affected; most savers will be; and anyone who has borrowed at a variable rate will
feel an impact. In a country like the United States with predominantly longer term
fixed rate mortgages, variations in the short-term nominal rates of interest set by the
central bank might have a rather small effect on the housing market (Figure 8).
Even in an economy like the UK, where most mortgages are variable rate, or fixed
for a very short period, the expected rate of return on houses in an expectations-
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driven housing boom may be much higher than any level of interest rates that can be
sustained for more than a very short period. The problem with using monetary policy
to stabilize the housing market would be acute if housing markets were overheating
when the wider economy was not and consumer price inflation was low even though
house price inflation was high. Unless one gave a weight to house prices in a measure
of consumer prices that was very high—and far higher than could be justified by
an ideal price index—this tension between using monetary policy to control general
price inflation and stabilize housing markets is unavoidable.3
A set of policy instruments more precisely targeted at the housing market
can be helpful in dealing with situations where the level of interest rates that
might be best suited to the wider economic situation is not the same as the rate
that might be needed to stabilize the housing market. A range of macroprudential
policy levers could be used to mitigate risks to financial stability emanating from
housing markets, graduating from more intensive supervision of underwriting stan-
dards through variations in capital requirements on mortgage lending to limits on
loan-to-income (LTI) and loan-to-value (LTV) ratios. Monetary policy can be re-
tained as a “last line of defense” against risks to financial stability. Indeed, this is
essentially the position taken in the UK today. The Financial Policy Committee of
the Bank of England has macroprudential levers to help maintain financial stabil-
ity. The FPC can ask the Monetary Policy Committee to adjust its policy (specif-
ically to modify its forward guidance) should it judge that the stance of monetary
policy poses a significant threat to financial stability that cannot be contained by the
policy actions available to it.
Central to volatility in housing markets, and the impacts that has on the wider
economy and upon welfare, is leverage, or debt gearing. Variations in permitted LTV
ratios, in LTI ratios, in capital requirements, and in interest rates set by the central
bank are all likely to have some impact on leverage, which is why they can help
stabilize housing market outcomes. But a world in which people could rely less upon
standard debt contracts to finance house purchases would probably be one in which
both individual household risk and aggregate housing market volatility was lower.
In that sense, developments that increased the scope for nondebt funding and which
permanently reduced the average level of gearing might much reduce the need to rely
on macroprudential or monetary policy levers to be pulled hard in cyclical upswings
because those upswings, and their consequences, would be less severe.
3. LOWER LEVERAGE THROUGH GREATER USE OF OUTSIDE EQUITY
How might households be made to rely less upon debt and more upon equity
to finance house purchases? One answer is just to have people provide more own
3. The weight on owners’ equivalent rent in the U.S. PCE deflator is around 11.5%, which is just a
little lower than the weight in the UK’s CPIH, an index that includes costs for owner–occupiers. With
those weights, if house prices were rising at 10%—and assuming that drove up owners’ equivalent rent by
the same amount—while all other prices rise at 2% the overall rate of inflation would still be under 3%.
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equity; that is, use more of their own funds and less debt to buy houses. This could
be achieved by direct controls; more-or-less permanent limits on LTV ratios. But
if the only source of equity is from the potential home owner the impact of much
higher equity funding on home ownership could be dramatic and unwelcome. In
many countries average house prices are around four or five times average annual
incomes—in some countries the ratio is higher.4 Suppose the typical price to income
ratio is 5 and it is desirable to have 30% of own equity at purchase (which would still
be a high gearing rate for most nonfinancial companies). If potential home owners
can save 10% of income from age 25 it would take close to 15 years to accumulate
the equity assuming they can earn a return on savings close to the average rate of
house price increase. That would mean that the date of becoming an owner–occupier
gets driven back to around 40, which would mean that owner occupation rates would
need to look much more like those in Germany than in the United States or the UK.
But if outside equity (or equity-like funding) were more readily available gearing
might be significantly reduced yet have a limited impact on home ownership patterns.
The idea of equity type funding of house purchase, which shares risk between owner–
occupiers and outside providers of funding is not a new one. There have been several
attempts to develop markets for types of shared equity funding—most notably in
Australia, and to a lesser extent in the UK and the United States (see Caplin et al.
1997, 2007, 2008, Shiller 1998, 2003, Whitehead 2010). But outside equity funding Q4
remains a very small part of the financing of house purchases.
The remainder of this paper considers types of outside equity contracts that, in
principle, might be feasible and have potential advantages. The main point I make is
that a continuum of contracts—where home owners face a menu of choices over how
much house price risk (much of which is idiosyncratic) they want to take—could
be envisaged. Practical issues with the implementation of such idealized contracts
are significant and I will briefly discuss them too. I start by describing a particular
type of flexible, risk-sharing funding.
4. RISK SHARING FUNDING5
Saving by the prospective home owner—the provision of internal equity—has
historically been the dominant form of equity. But there are feasible sources of
4. The median sale price for new houses sold in the United States (from St. Louis Fed) relative to nomi-
nal gross disposable income per household (population/average household size) is about 3. In comparison,
taking data from Numbeo.com, which is a database of user contributed data, for the 20 largest U.S. cities
(excluding El Paso as data are not available) and weighting by population yields a figure close to 5. For the
UK, Land Registry data give an estimate of around 4. But dividing average UK house prices (published by
the DCLG) by the average disposable income per household gives a figure of 6.7 for 2010. Numbeo.com
also puts the UK ratio at close to 7 based on user supplied data. The Numbeo data implies the typical house
price-to-income ratio for Germany Ireland and Canada is around 5; for France and Spain it appears to be
rather higher. According to a study recently published by the Reserve Bank of Australia on Dwelling Prices
and Household Income (see Graph 5 in http://www.rba.gov.au/publications/bulletin/2012/dec/2.html), av-
erage dwelling prices are four to five times of the average household disposable income in many developed
countries.
5. This section draws upon Miles (2012).
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external equity for which the financial contracts are analogous to home owners
issuing equity shares in their own home.
The key feature of outside equity financing is that the repayment value is explicitly
linked to the value of the home. From the point of view of the funder this means that
their rate of return depends on the value of the property whose purchase they help
finance. I consider a type of contract where the return to the funder comes in the form
of a final payout, which is linked to the value of the property at the relevant horizon
(which might be the point at which a property is sold). A periodic payment—which is
analogous to a dividend and in this context could be considered a rental payment from
the occupier for that part of the property, which is funded by external equity—can be
zero so long as the expected overall return from the contract is equal to the required
rate. The Help to Buy equity loan scheme recently launched by the UK government
is something of a hybrid in this respect. It is a loan whose repayment value is a
given proportion of the value of the property and on which no regular payments
are needed for 5 years, after which a regular payment is paid until the property is
sold. This scheme, where up to 20% of the value of a property can be financed
with external equity, is only available for the purchase of newly built houses and
apartments.
The Help to Buy scheme is an example of what has been called an equity loan.
Unlike with shared ownership schemes—which has been the more common form of
external equity financing—with equity loans the buyer retains the ownership of the
entire property. Equity loans share an important characteristic with an outright equity
stake taken by an outside funder, namely that the outside funder takes on some of the
risk of a fall in the value of the house, which becomes a risk shared with the owner.
This is different from Shared Appreciation Mortgages (SAMs) in which the home
owner shares any appreciation with the lender but does not get any insurance against
house price falls (for discussion of SAMS and other ways of sharing house price risk,
see Sanders and Slawson 2005). Equity loans are comparable to Home Appreciation
Participation Notes (HAPNs) in creating true risk sharing (for details of HAPNs, see
Cassidy, Dennis, and Yang 2008).
With an equity loan the interest rate on the funding is effectively tied to the evolution
of the value of the house. Equity loans are hybrid instruments, with characteristics
somewhere between straightforward debt and equity. Consider a funding contract
with the following features: the outside provider of funds provides some proportion,
g, of the purchase price of the house. When a property is sold the outside funder
receives a single (final) payment, which is equal to the original amount provided plus
a proportion of the capital gain or loss on the property. The proportion of the gain or
loss need not equal g (and in fact to generate an expected return equal to the required
rate it will be very unlikely that the portion could be g). Furthermore, the proportion
that is taken of a positive capital gain may be different from the proportion of a capital
loss that is taken. In general, there will be an infinite set of combinations of a share
of any capital gain and a share of a capital loss that will generate a given expected
rate of return on the equity loan.
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The shares in the upside (rises in house values) and the downside (falls in house
values) that the provider of an equity loan would need to take to make it a reasonable
deal—given that the loan pays no regular interest—depends on the probabilities of
house price changes over long periods. There is a continuum of contracts that could be
acceptable to lenders; those that have smaller shares of the upside also have smaller
shares of the downside. To show what type of contracts might be feasible, I will
assume that house price changes follow a log normal distribution and are generated
by:
ln(P)t=a+b ln(P)t − 1+e,
where e is a random shock that follows a normal distribution. We should think of
this as a model for the evolution of the price of a single property P and so e is a
house-specific shock. Some element of house-specific shocks may be common across
a region or a whole country. But a significant element of such shocks is likely to be
house (or at least neighborhood) specific. If (as seems likely) b is very close to unity
then a is the expected rate of house price inflation. We will assume from here that b
is 1.
Denote the proportion of any house value appreciation that is paid to the provider
of an equity loan by u (u for upside share), the proportion of any house price fall that
is taken by the equity loan be d (d for downside share) and the percentage change in
house prices by p. Let the required expected rate of return on the equity loan be Re.
As noted above the value of the equity loan as a proportion of the value of the house
when purchased is denoted by g. The rate of return (ex post) on an equity loan is then
given by
pu/g if p > 0,
pd/g if p > 0.
The equilibrium condition is that
Re = E(pu/g|p > 0)prob (p > 0) + E(pd/g|p < 0).prob (p < 0),
where
E(pu/g|p > 0) is the expectation ofpu/g conditional onp > 0
and
E(pd/g|p < 0) is the expectation ofpd/g conditional onp < 0.
I calibrate the simple model of house prices by reference to UK and U.S. experience.
Based on quarterly data of regional house price indices6 for the UK over the period
6. The Nationwide regional house price indices.
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TABLE 1
EQUITY LOAN – EQUILIBRIUM COMBINATIONS OF UPSIDE AND DOWNSIDE SHARES OF INVESTORa
Share of upside 29% 30% 32% 33% 35% 36% 38% 39% 41% 42%
Share of downside 0% 10% 20% 31% 43% 57% 68% 78% 92% 100%
aAssumptions: Equity loan is 20% of house value. Percentage change in house price value over 5 years follows a normal distribution with
mean of 15% and standard deviation of 20%. Required rate of return on equity loan is 25% over 5 years.
1990–2013(Q3), the average (across regions) of the mean and standard deviation of
quarterly changes in log(nominal) house prices are 1.1% and 3.3%. Based on Case–
Shiller data for house prices in major US cities over the period 1990–2013(Q2), the
averages of mean and standard deviation of quarterly changes in log house prices are
0.8% and 2.9%.
The mean changes aggregate easily for different time periods—so the average
return over 5 years is simply 20 times the average quarterly return. This is not true for
standard deviations—only under the assumption that the quarterly random shocks (e)
are independent and of constant volatility will the 5-year return variance be 20 times
the quarterly variance. That variance is only a guide to the volatility of regional house
prices—the volatility of specific house prices will almost certainly be significantly
greater. (In fact, the UK data suggest that the 5 year variance is rather more than 20
times the quarterly variance.) Initially I will use that lower bound on the variability
of the price of property—but then show the impact of using significantly higher
variability.
I initially will assume that 5 years is the relevant horizon for contracts—although
as I shall show below the key parameters u and d are not sensitive to varying the
investment horizon. Table 1 shows combinations of upside (u) and downside (d)
shares due to an equity lender where the 5-year percentage change in the value of a
house follows a normal distribution with an assumed mean of 15% and a standard
deviation of 20%. (As a point of comparison, Shiller and Weiss (2003) estimated thatQ5
the standard deviation of the change in US citywide log prices over an 8-year horizon
was 25.2%; scaling by the square root of 5/8 gives a 5-year estimate of exactly 20%.).
The assumed mean rate of change of house prices is slightly lower than the realized
average across UK regions and the US cities over 5-year horizons since 1990—which
are between 22% and 16%. But that period includes the massive run up in prices in
the years before the financial crash, which was only partially unwound in the period
since 2007. As a basis for an expected increase in nominal house price, growth from
now onward that historic mean is probably a bit high. The standard deviation of 20%
is around the sample standard deviation of UK regional house prices in the past and
somewhat higher than the US standard deviation based on prices in major cities. I will
initially assume that the required expected (or average) nominal return is 25% over 5
years—which with a 2% inflation rate is about a 3% average annual real return. This
might seem quite low for a required rate of return, but house price inflation is not well
correlated with changes in stock and bond prices and so an investor with a diversified
12
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
UN
CO
RR
EC
TE
D P
RO
OF
DAVID MILES : 13
TABLE 2
VARYING HOUSE PRICE VOLATILITY—EQUILIBRIUM UPSIDE SHARE OF INVESTORa
Share of upside 33% 32% 32% 31% 30% 30% 29% 28%
Standard deviation house price change 5% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40% 45%
aAssumptions: Equity loan is 20% of house value. Percentage change in house price value over 5 years follows a Normal distribution with
15% mean. Required rate of return on equity loan is 25% over 5 years.
TABLE 3
VARYING TIME HORIZONS—EQUILIBRIUM UPSIDE SHARES OF INVESTORa
Share of upside 30% 31% 32% 32% 33% 33% 33%
Time horizon (years) 3 4 5 7 10 20 25
TABLE 4
VARYING REQUIRED RATES OF RETURN ON THE LOAN—EQUILIBRIUM UPSIDE SHARE OF INVESTORa
Share of upside 20% 26% 32% 37% 43% 49% 55%
Required return on the loan 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40% 45%
portfolio might not require much of a risk premium for an asset with returns linked
to house prices.7 I consider a loan worth 20% of the value of a property (g = 0.2).
Table 1 reveals several things: First, in principle it is possible for home owners
to sell all downside risk—with the base parameters it is possible for providers of an
equity loan to insure against 100% of house price falls in exchange for taking about
42% of all gains in house value.8 With the calibration above the chance that house
prices will be lower at the end of 5 years is about 23% so this insurance is of value.
Second, there is a big range of risk sharing that is feasible. With home owners taking
no insurance against the loss in house value, they would give up just under 30% of
any capital appreciation in exchange for 20% of funding; if they wanted insurance
against 50% of house price losses, they would need to give up about 36% of any
house price appreciation. Third, providers of equity loans need to receive more of
any house price appreciation than the share of funding they provide; even with no
downside protection for the homeowner the providers of loans need to get almost 1.5
times as much of any appreciation as they provide of the funding (29% of upside, or
capital gain, for 20% of funding).
Tables 2–5 show how the characteristics of the equilibrium shares of upside risk
taken by the provider of equity loans varies as we use different assumptions for:
7. In the UK, there is a negative correlation between monthly changes in house prices and in stock and
bond indices in the period since 1990.
8. But as I discuss below moral hazard becomes serious when so much of downside or upside house
price risk is passed on to outside providers of equity.
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TABLE 5
VARYING AVERAGE HOUSE PRICE CHANGES—EQUILIBRIUM UPSIDE SHARE OF INVESTORa
Share of upside 67% 51% 42% 32% 25% 20% 17%
Mean house price change over 5 years 3% 7% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30%
aAssumptions: Equity loan is 20% of house value. Percentage change in house price value over 5 years follows a normal distribution with
20% standard deviation. The share taken of any house price fall is 20%.
Required rate of return on equity loan is 25% over 5 years, except in Table 4 where it is varied.
Average house price change is 15% over 5-year horizon, except in Table 5 where it is varied;
in Table 3 the average house price change is assumed to be 3% a year.
the volatility of house prices (Table 2); the time horizon of the investment (Table 3,
where we multiply the baseline means and variances of house price returns by the
time horizon, which is appropriate for the random walk with drift model); the required
rate of return on the loans (Table 4); and for the mean expected rate of house price
appreciation (Table 5). These table show how the upside share to the equity investor
(their share of any capital gain) varies for a given downside share as we vary various
features of the economy. In each of the tables we assume the equity loan is 20% of
the house value and that the share taken of any house price fall is also 20%. For the
base case (Table 2, using a 20% standard deviation of house prices over 5 years), this
generated an equilibrium share of any upside gain of 32%.
Table 2 shows that varying very substantially the volatility of house price changes
has a rather small impact on the share of the upside that needs to be paid to the
provider of an equity loan. At exceptionally low volatility (a 5% standard deviation
over 5 years) that share is one third. The share is close to 30% for volatilities between
20% and 40%. A volatility range of between 20% and 40% is likely to cover the
plausible range for most properties: the lower point of that range is where there is
little idiosyncratic house price risk beyond the level of regional variability; the upper
point is where idiosyncratic risk is as large as regional risk. Table 2 shows that over
that range there is very little variability in the upside share required, which is very
useful because a risk neutral provider of outside equity would then not need to know
at all precisely the volatility of house prices in order to offer feasible contracts to
home owners.
Changing the time horizon has an impact on the nature of sustainable contracts.
(This is a point made by Caplin et al. 2007.) The share of the upside needed to be
paid to the equity provider does rise gradually with the time horizon. But when log
house prices follow the random walk model, the variability in the required share is
very small (from 30% to 33% as horizons vary from 3 to 25 years). This is important
because if the equity loan is settled at the time of sale the provider will not know the
relevant time horizon and so the fact that the upside share needed to generate a given
average rate of return is not sensitive to time horizon is very useful. Not surprisingly
varying the expected rate of house price change has a very substantial effect, as does
varying the required rate of return.
It is important to stress that in principle there are an infinite number of combinations
of upside and downside shares that generate the required rate of return for any
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given economic environment. In Tables 2–5, the downside share is fixed to isolate
the effect of changing features of the economy upon the upside share. Table 1, in
contrast, showed a number of combinations of upside and downside shares for a given
economy.
The useful thing about there being a continuum of contracts is that home owners
could, in principle, decide how much house price risk they wanted to sell and how
asymmetric a contract they were prepared to accept to reduce the monthly servicing
cost of the overall debt on a property. But although in theory there is a continuum
of contracts that can generate the required return to providers of equity loans there
are incentive reasons why some contracts with very high insurance against loss (high
downside shares) or very high shares of capital gains handed to providers of equity
loans might not be feasible. Moral hazard can rule out such extremes. Providers of
equity loans might not wish to choose combinations of upside and downside shares,
which mean they take a very high share of any downside (in which case home owners
have little incentive to maintain properties if they do start to slip in value) or a very
high share of the upside (in which case home owners have little incentive to maintain
properties once their prices have risen substantially). Shiller and Weiss (2003) show
that these incentive effects are very serious if outsider providers of finance take a
share of the upside or downside that is high—say 50% or more.
There are also practical issues with the timing of people moving house and making
sure that home owners understand contracts they have entered to, and adjusting
the ownership shares if homeowners make home improvements (adding bedrooms,
converting attics, and such) is not in practice trivial. As discussed by Shiller and Weiss
(2003), these incentive and information problems are not side issues. Nonetheless,
equity type funding of house purchase has major attractions—at both the micro- and
macrolevel. At the micro level, they have the potential to allow more efficient sharing
of house price risk. The purchase of a very expensive asset by means of high leverage
is not—to put it mildly—self-evidently the optimal contract (Shiller 1998, 2003). At
the macrolevel, a useful feature of equity loans is that effectively the interest rate paid
on the loan is linked to the rate of house price inflation—the higher is house price
inflation, the higher is the effective interest rate on a portion of the funding of houses,
which could be a stabilizing force.
5. CONCLUSIONS
There are problems with greater use of outside equity in funding house purchase.
For example, where interest payments on mortgage debt are tax deductible, there
is an inherent bias against equity financing of house purchase. The moral hazard
issues of linking repayments on outside funding to the house value are also serious.
Calculations by Shiller and Weiss (2003) suggest that equity loans that represent
much more than 20% of funding would probably create very poor incentives for
home owners because outsiders might then need to take the majority of capital
12
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
UN
CO
RR
EC
TE
D P
RO
OF
16 : MONEY, CREDIT AND BANKING
gains or losses. But switching even 20% of funding from debt to outside equity
very substantially reduces leverage—from 10 to 3 one-third for a home owner that
provides 10% of equity themselves, and greater use of such funding does get to the
heart of many recent housing market problems, which stem from very high leverage
in house purchase, particularly for new buyers. Someone who took out a 90% LTV
ratio, nonamortizing (interest only) mortgage will have negative equity if house prices
fall by 10%. At the end of a 5-year horizon—with a mean rate of price rise of 15%
and a standard deviation of 20%—the chances of negative equity using the log price
model used above is then about 10%. If the home owner took a 70% mortgage, had
20% of funding from an equity loan (sharing 20% of any downside loss) and used
the saving on interest payments to pay down the loan then the balance at the end of
5 years would be around 64% of the loan (at an interest rate of 5%). It would now
take a fall in house prices of 20% to create negative equity. If the house fell in value
to 80 (from an initial 100), the equity loan of 20 would have a repayment value of
16 which, together with the debt of 64, would just equal the home value of 80. The
chances of such a fall in price are just under 4%.
In the United States, 14.5% of mortgaged homes are estimated to have been in
negative equity in the first half of 2013.9 (This is already a substantial improvement
from 2012, where over 20% of mortgages were probably in negative equity.) Had 20%
of funding for these properties come from outside equity, debt might have exceeded
house values in slightly less than 10% of mortgaged homes—a fall of one third in
the numbers with negative equity.10 Fewer people would have had incentives to walk
away from debt. Mortgage servicing costs would have been lower as mortgage loans
would have been smaller and rates charged on them lower. As a result, foreclosures
would have been less prevalent. Losses would have been born less by highly levered
banks, and more by less levered providers of outside equity. The Great Recession
could have been less severe.
Getting a market in equity loans established is not easy and various shared equity
products in the past (most of which were not equity loans) have a patchy success rate.
But the recently launched equity loan product provided by the UK government for
those buying newly built homes (under its Help to Buy scheme) has proved popular.
In the first 6 months of the scheme (April–October 2013) around 15,000 reservations
9. CoreLogic (2013), Equity Report, Q2.
10. This is based on the same comparison of pure mortgage debt finance versus combined mortgage
debt and equity finance as in the previous paragraph. Based on the Case–Shiller national index, U.S. house
prices are down from their peak by about 20%. CoreLogic (2013) estimate that this fall left 2.6% of
mortgaged residential properties with an LTV ratio between 100% and 105%, and 6.1% with an LTV ratio
between 105% and 125% in 2013 Q2. If we assume that those in the latter group were evenly distrusted,
then about 2.25% had an LTV between 105 and 112.5. That would mean that about 4.85% ( = 2.6% +
2.25%) of properties were in negative equity by less than 12.5%, following the 20% drop in house prices.
Someone who would have used outside equity to finance 20% of the purchase instead of taking out a 90%
LTV ratio mortgage would be in positive equity following a fall in house prices of up to 20%. If house
value falls by exactly 20%, they would have a LTV ratio of 100% as opposed to a LTV ratio of 112.5%, if
they had taken out a 90% LTV ratio mortgage. This is the basis for the crude estimate that the proportion
of properties in negative equity might have fallen from 14.5% to a bit under 10% had home owners used
20% equity loans.
to buy new homes were made, a rate t hat is arou nd 25% of the level of all newly 
built homes over that period. 
High leverage is at the heart of  problems in  housing market. Monetary poli cy 
and macroprudential policy can influence leverage. But more fundamentally use of 
outside e quity might be a  way of perm anently bri nging d own rel iance u pon debt 
financing. Switching just 10% or 2 0% of funding from debt to outside equity very 
substantially redu ces leverage. T he m oral hazard at that sca le of outsi de equity 
funding might be low enough to make such contracts commercially feasible. 
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